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CHILDREN WITH GENDER DYSPHORIA AND THE 





I   INTRODUCTION 
Gender dysphoria is described as ‘[m]ental distress caused by unhappiness 
with one’s own sex and the desire to be identified as the opposite sex’.P1F1P Gender 
dysphoria is distinguished from being intersex, the subject of a recent Australian 
Senate Committee report, which is referable to physical characteristics.P2F2P It is also 
distinguished from gender non-conformism, gender diversity or transsexualismP3F3P 
as, in addition to identifying and living as one’s non-natal gender, it involves 
‘clinically significant distress’.P4F4 P Unfortunately, children with gender dysphoria 
(and indeed many gender diverse young people) are almost by definition at a 
high risk of depression and anxiety, as well as social isolation, self-harm and 
                                                 
*  Lecturer, School of Law, University of Wollongong. Thanks to Ian Lawson, Dr Linda Steele, and the two 
anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. All opinions and errors are my own. 
1  Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Involuntary or Coerced 
Sterilisation of Intersex People in Australia (2013) 55 [3.68] n 85. The term ‘gender dysphoria’ is 
preferred here over ‘gender identity disorder’ – the latter terminology has been abandoned in the most 
recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5. See American Psychiatric 
Association, Gender Dysphoria (Fact Sheet, 2013) 1 <http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Gender%20 
Dysphoria%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf>. 
2  Senate Community Affairs References Committee, above n 1, 1–2 [1.6]. 
3  There is a wide and fluctuating range of terms used by the gender diverse and transgender communities: 
see, eg, the glossary in Elizabeth Smith et al, From Blues to Rainbows: The Mental Health and Well-
Being of Gender Diverse and Transgender Young People in Australia (Australian Research Centre in 
Sex, Health and Society, La Trobe University and University of New England, 2014) 6–7. I use the term 
‘gender dysphoria’ to describe the very particular situation of the children and young people in the 
Family Court cases and ‘gender diverse’ to capture a broader range of ‘non-conforming’ gender 
identities. 
4  American Psychiatric Association, Gender Dysphoria, above n 1, 1. 
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suicide.P5F5P This is unsurprisingly often connected to the discrimination and abuse 
suffered by these groups. 
It is now more readily accepted, and due to advances in medical technology, 
easier than ever before for persons with gender dysphoria to alter their own 
physical characteristics to more closely conform to their inner gender or identity, 
a process often referred to as ‘transition’.P6F 6 P This may occur through hormone 
therapy or through surgical procedures.P7F7P  
There is an expansive literature concerning the role which law plays in 
regulating sexual and gender identity, including in diverse gender communities. 
Scholarship around transgender communities and the law has examined areas 
such as discrimination and violence against gender diverse people,P8F8P and access to 
appropriate healthcare, including for young people.P9F9P For gender diverse youth, 
school, community and even family may be sites of oppression and victimisation: 
                                                 
5  Smith et al, above n 3. They report that of the gender diverse young people in their study, ‘[e]ighty-one 
per cent (n = 104) … who had experienced abuse and/or discrimination due to their gender expression 
had thought about suicide and 37 [per cent] had made suicide attempts’: at 67. See also American 
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5 (5th ed, 2013) 
451–460; Jacqueline K Hewitt et al, ‘Hormone Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder in a Cohort of 
Children and Adolescents’ (2012) 196 Medical Journal of Australia 578, 578, 581; Michelle Henderson, 
Kids with Gender Issues Suffer Depression, NineMSN (online), 21 May 2012 <http://www.9news. 
com.au/technology/2012/10/10/10/ 47/kids-with-gender-issues-suffer-depression>, reporting that every 
child treated at Australia’s first clinic for childhood gender dysphoria was suffering depression and 
anxiety; Rita Lee, ‘Health Care Problems of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Patients’ (2000) 
172 Western Journal of Medicine 403, 403, reporting that 40 per cent of lesbian, gay, bisexual or 
transgender youth have either attempted or seriously contemplated suicide; Mary Huft, ‘Statistically 
Speaking: The High Rate of Suicidality among Transgender Youth and Access Barriers to Medical 
Treatment in a Society of Gender Dichotomy’ (2008) 28(1) Children’s Legal Rights Journal 53, 53. 
6  Smith et al, above n 3, 39; Erika Skougard, ‘The Best Interests of Transgender Children’ [2011] Utah 
Law Review 1161, 1169–72. 
7  Hewitt et al, above n 5, 578; Bram Kuiper and Peggy Cohen-Kettenis, ‘Sex Reassignment Surgery: A 
Study of 141 Dutch Transsexuals’ (1988) 17 Archives of Sexual Behavior 439; F Leavitt et al, 
‘Presurgical Adjustment in Male Transsexuals With and Without Hormonal Treatment’ (1980) 168 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 693. 
8  Laura Grenfell and Anne Hewitt, ‘Gender Regulation: Restrictive, Facilitative or Transformative Laws?’ 
(2012) 34 Sydney Law Review 761; Alex Sharpe, ‘Criminalising Sexual Intimacy: Transgender 
Defendants and the Legal Construction of Non-consent’ [2014] Criminal Law Review 207; Abigail W 
Lloyd, ‘Defining the Human: Are Transgender People Strangers to the Law?’ (2005) 20 Berkeley Journal 
of Gender, Law & Justice 150; Andrew N Sharpe and Leslie J Moran, ‘Violence, Identity and Policing: 
The Case of Violence against Transgender People’ (2004) 4 Criminal Justice 395; Andrew Alston, 
‘Transgender Rights as Legal Rights’ (1999) 7 Canterbury Law Review 329; Nan Seuffert, ‘Reflections 
on Transgender Immigration’ (2009) 18 Griffith Law Review 428. 
9  Huft, above n 5; Amanda Kennedy, ‘Because We Say So: The Unfortunate Denial of Rights to 
Transgender Minors Regarding Transitions’ (2008) 19 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 281; Sonja 
Shield, ‘The Doctor Won’t See You Now: Rights of Transgender Adolescents to Sex Reassignment 
Treatment’ (2007) 31 New York University Review of Law & Social Change 361. See also Holly V 
Franson, ‘The Rise of the Transgender Child: Overcoming Societal Stigma, Institutional Discrimination, 
and Individual Bias to Enact and Enforce Nondiscriminatory Dress Code Policies’ (2013) 84 University 
of Colorado Law Review 497.  
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in Australia, the extension of formal legal protections to these groups is relatively 
recent.P10F 10 P The broader context of some work has been to challenge the law’s 
promulgation of binary conceptions of gender and to promote ideas about rights 
to gender equality and self-determination.P11F11P It is against such a backdrop that this 
article seeks to explore one particular aspect of the legal regulation of gender 
diversity which concerns young people’s access to hormone therapy in Australia.  
While it is difficult to obtain estimates about the prevalence of gender 
dysphoria in the population,P12F12P greater attention has been paid in recent years to 
manifestations of gender dysphoria in children and adolescents, both in 
Australian popular media P13F13P and in scholarly journals.P14F14P The intensity of gender 
dysphoria experienced by young children is a predictor of its continuance,P15F15P and 
gender dysphoria that persists into adolescence is more likely to continue into 
adulthood.P16F16 P As puberty is the time at which children begin to develop adult 
                                                 
10  Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) ss 5A–5C, as inserted by Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual 
Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013 (Cth) sch 1 cl 17; see also Grenfell and 
Hewitt, above n 8, 778–82.  
11  See, eg, P L Chau and Jonathan Herring, ‘Defining, Assigning and Designing Sex’ (2002) 16 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 327; Chinyere Ezie, ‘Deconstructing the Body: 
Transgender and Intersex Identities and Sex Discrimination – The Need for Strict Scrutiny’ (2011) 20 
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 141; Amy D Ronner, ‘Let’s Get the “Trans” and “Sex” Out of It 
and Free Us All’ (2013) 16 Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 859. See also the sources cited in nn 8–9 
of this article. 
12  ‘For natal adult males, prevalence ranges from 0.005% to 0.014%, and for natal females, from 0.002% to 
0.003%. Since not all adults seeking hormone treatment and surgical reassignment attend specialty 
clinics, these rates are likely modest underestimates’: American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5, above n 
5, 454.  
13  Four Corners: Being Me (Directed by Janine Cohen and Catherine Scott, Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2014) <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2014/11/17/4127631.htm>; Simon Lauder, 
‘Teen Cross Gender Clinic Calls for More Services’, ABC News (online), 21 May 2012 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-05-21/teen-cross-gender-clinic-calls-for-more-services/4024426>; 
Paul Chai, ‘Just a Girl, in the World’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 9 September 2012 
<http://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/just-a-girl-in-the-world-20120908-25c80.html>; ‘Gender Disorder 
Affects Girls Too’, The Australian (Sydney) 5 June 2013; Jeannette Francis, ‘How Young Is Too Young 
To Change Sex?’, SBS World News (online), 1 May 2013 <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/05/ 
01/how-young-too-young-change-sex>; Myfanwy McDonald, ‘Don’t Demonise Doctors for Treating 
Gender Identity Disorder’, The Conversation (online), 9 April 2013 <http://theconversation.com/dont-
demonise-doctors-for-treating-gender-identity-disorder-9593>. 
14  Hewitt et al, above n 5; Norman P Spack et al, ‘Children and Adolescents with Gender Identity Disorder 
Referred to a Pediatric Medical Center’ (2012) 129 Pediatrics 418; Peggy T Cohen-Kettenis, Thomas D 
Steensma and Annelou L de Vries, ‘Treatment of Adolescents with Gender Dysphoria in the Netherlands’ 
(2011) 20 Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 689; Annelou L C de Vries et al, ‘Puberty Suppression in 
Adolescents with Gender Identity Disorder: A Prospective Follow-Up Study’ (2011) 8 Journal of Sexual 
Medicine 2276; Thomas D Steensma et al, ‘Factors Associated with Desistence and Persistence of 
Childhood Gender Dysphoria: A Quantitative Follow-Up Study’ (2013) 52 Journal of the American 
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 582. 
15  Steensma et al, ‘Quantitative Follow-Up Study’, above n 14, 583, 586–8. 
16  Madeleine S C Wallien and Peggy T Cohen-Kettenis, ‘Psychosexual Outcome of Gender-Dysphoric 
Children’ (2008) 47 Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 1413, 1420–1.  
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physical characteristics, a treatment option for children with gender dysphoria is 
to suppress the onset of puberty through the use of hormones, P17F17P and subsequently 
to commence further hormone treatment so as to promote the development of 
non-natal physical attributes.P18F18P  
Typically, when children or people with disabilities cannot agree to receiving 
medical treatment due to an inability to give informed consent, parents or 
guardians may authorise treatment instead, but not all treatment. In Secretary, 
Department of Health and Community Services v JWB (‘Marion’s Case’),P19F19P the 
High Court held that there are some categories of medical procedure to which 
parents or guardians may not consent. In that case, the majority found that the 
procedure in question, the sterilisation of an intellectually disabled girl, was 
outside the scope of parental authorisation.P20F20 
Applying Marion’s Case to a different set of circumstances, the Family Court 
determined in Re Alex that hormone therapy for a child with gender dysphoria is 
similarly outside the bounds of parental consent.P21F21P Accordingly, hormone therapy 
could only commence with the approval of the Court, notwithstanding that a 
child, his or her family and his or her treating medical practitioners may all have 
been in agreement as to the course of treatment proposed.P22F22P  
In 2013, the Full Court of the Family Court reconsidered this position in Re 
Jamie,P23F23P an appeal from a decision of Dessau J wherein her Honour authorised 
hormone treatment for a 10-year-old child, Jamie, with gender dysphoria.P24F 24 P 
Jamie’s parents did not contest the effect of Justice Dessau’s decision, but rather 
claimed that they already possessed the right to authorise treatment on Jamie’s 
behalf, this being an aspect of parental responsibility. Accordingly, they 
challenged the Court’s jurisdiction to authorise this kind of treatment.P25F 25 P The 
result was a modification, but not abandonment, of the need for court 
authorisation, wherein a guardian may authorise the first ‘stage’ of treatment but 
not the second.  
                                                 
17  Specifically, gonadotrophin-releasing hormone analogue: see Royal College of Psychiatrists, ‘Good 
Practice Guidelines for the Assessment and Treatment of Adults with Gender Dysphoria’ (College Report 
No 181, 2013) 20. This is often referred to as ‘stage one’ treatment. 
18  This is sometimes referred to as ‘cross-sex hormone therapy’ or ‘stage two’ treatment: Peggy T Cohen-
Kettenis and Stephanie H M van Goozen, ‘Sex Reassignment of Adolescent Transsexuals: A Follow-Up 
Study’ (1997) 36 Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 263, 265; Marshall 
Dahl et al, ‘Physical Aspects of Transgender Endocrine Therapy’ (2006) 9(3–4) International Journal of 
Transgenderism 111, 112, 117, 121.  
19  (1992) 175 CLR 218. 
20  Ibid 249–54 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
21  Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89. Note that all decisions of the family law courts utilise pseudonyms for 
minors. 
22  As discussed below, where a child’s guardians or doctors do not agree is a situation in which the court’s 
powers are more appropriately required: see Part V.  
23  (2013) 278 FLR 155. 
24  Re Jamie (Special Medical Procedure) [2011] FamCA 248. 
25  Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 157 [4] (Bryant CJ). 
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The extension of the ratio in Marion’s Case to children with gender 
dysphoria has both practical and symbolic implications. The practical effect is to 
place a time-consuming, expensive and stressful hurdle in the path of young 
people who are seeking treatment, and their families.P26F26P It is ironic that, given the 
discursive focus on ‘hearing’ children and upholding children’s rights in the 
family law jurisdiction,P27F 27 P the requirement to seek court authorisation adds an 
additional layer of anxiety and uncertainty for individual children already caught 
up in a very confusing time in their lives.  
On a symbolic level, the concern surrounding cases of childhood gender 
dysphoria and the restrictions placed on access to treatment illustrate how ill-
equipped the Family Court is to deal with childhood manifestations of sexuality 
and gender identity. It is hard to imagine that adolescents would be unable to 
pursue treatment if suffering another type of psychological condition carrying 
such devastating potential consequences,P28F 28 P raising the question of why this 
particular treatment is so highly regulated. This is especially so when the 
decision in Marion’s Case does not compel the approach taken by the Family 
Court. By cementing its jurisdictional reach, the Court has positioned itself as 
part of the machinery of social regulation of non-normative gender identity.  
This article contends that decisions about hormone therapy for children with 
gender dysphoria should be made, in the absence of disagreement between them, 
by children, their families and treating medical practitioners, without the need for 
application to a court. Two main arguments are raised in support. First, the 
extension of Marion’s Case to children with gender dysphoria is based on a 
misreading of that decision and is thus legally unwarranted. Secondly, this 
expansion of jurisdiction produces harmful effects in the form both of material 
social and psychological consequences for individual young people, and in 
reinforcing ideas about the need to regulate ‘abnormal’ manifestations of gender 
identity. 
Accordingly, Part II discusses the expansion of the Family Court’s 
jurisdiction – to the exclusion of parental power and children’s own capacity  
to consent – so as to encompass decisions relating to treatment for gender 
dysphoria. Part III examines in detail the High Court’s reasoning in Marion’s 
                                                 
26  This was acknowledged by the Full Court in Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 184 [138] (Bryant CJ), 192 
[185] (Finn J). See also Hewitt et al, above n 5, 578; Insight: Transgender (Directed by Maggie Palmer, 
Special Broadcasting Service, 2013) <http://www.sbs.com.au/insight/episode/overview/573/ 
Transgender#.U5ehzCgbgZY>.  
27  See, eg, Justice Diana Bryant, ‘The Role of the Family Court in Promoting Child-Centred Practice’ 
(2006) 20 Australian Journal of Family Law 127; Susie O’Brien, ‘Judge: Give Kids More Say’ Herald 
Sun (Melbourne), 31 July 2014, 5. 
28  Indeed, Beh and Diamond have observed of the United States that ‘[i]n 2003 some 3700 breast 
augmentation surgeries were performed on teenage girls … Males and females, thus, are denied surgery 
only if it is associated with a desire to change their sex, not if it is to enhance gender stereotypes’: Hazel 
Beh and Milton Diamond, ‘Ethical Concerns Related to Treating Gender Nonconformity in Childhood 
and Adolescence: Lessons from the Family Court of Australia’ (2005) 15 Health Matrix 239, 270 n 152. 
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Case and how this has been applied by the Family Court. Part IV then turns to 
the impact of the decision in Re Jamie and considers when children may be able 
to consent to treatment themselves. Finally, Part V advocates the adoption of a 
broader interpretation of the right to personal inviolability in understanding and 
applying Marion’s Case to children with gender dysphoria. 
 
II   THE LIMITS OF PARENTAL POWER 
Marion’s Case confirmed the existence of a category of certain medical 
procedures to which parents are unable to consent on behalf of their minor 
children.P29F 29 P The situation arose when the parents of an adolescent girl with 
physical and intellectual disabilities, Marion, sought that she be sterilised. The 
parents sought a hysterectomy for Marion on the basis that menstruation caused 
her pain, psychological distress and associated behavioural problems.P30F30P Marion’s 
family and caregivers were also concerned about the negative impact that 
pregnancy and childbirth would likely have upon Marion.P31F31P Sterilisation would, 
of course, also have a contraceptive effect. 
Under the common law, consent enables medical treatment which would 
otherwise be an assault on a person.P32F32P If a patient is unable to consent due to 
young age or disability, his or her guardian may authorise the treatment. The 
objective seriousness or riskiness of the situation is not relevant: parents may 
consent to both their child’s heart operation and routine medical check-up. 
However, the High Court found that the sterilisation sought for Marion was for a 
‘non-therapeutic’ purpose.P33F33 P In so finding, the majority distinguished between 
sterilisation as an ‘incidental result of surgery performed to cure a disease or 
correct some malfunction’,P34F 34 P and the procedure sought for Marion.P35F 35 P Had 
sterilisation been the necessary consequence of medically approved treatment for 
cancer, this would be for a therapeutic purpose, and hence Marion’s parents 
                                                 
29  The decision confirmed earlier Family Court determinations in Re Jane (1988) 94 FLR 1 and Re 
Elizabeth (1989) 96 FLR 248. Typically, the age of majority is 18 years. In usual circumstances, parents 
are able to consent to medical treatment on behalf of their children under 18, such consent being 
necessary to vitiate what would otherwise be an assault. If children are ‘Gillick competent’, they may 
consent themselves. 
30  Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 229 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid 233–4 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), 310 (McHugh J). 
33 Ibid 250 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
34  Ibid 253 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).  
35  Ibid 306 (Deane J), 282 (Brennan J), 321 (McHugh J). Justice Deane held that sterilisation for 
contraceptive purposes would require court authorisation, Brennan J held that a ‘non-therapeutic’ 
procedure could not be consented to by the parents nor by the Court, while McHugh J held that the 
parents could consent to the procedure if it was for the protection of the child’s physical or mental health.  
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could authorise the treatment.P36F 36 P A non-therapeutic medical procedure was 
different. The High Court held that parents are unable to consent to a procedure 
not in the child’s best interests: it is this ‘overriding criterion’ which ‘is itself a 
limit on parental power’.P37F37P There may, however, be cases where it is unclear as to 
whether the procedure is in the child’s best interests or not.P38F38P In such instances, it 
will be up to a court to make the determination. 
A court’s ability to consent on behalf of the minor or incapacitated person 
who is the subject of the proposed procedure is founded in the general welfare 
jurisdiction of the superior state courts. Deriving from the power and 
responsibility of the state to provide care and protection to those unable to do so 
themselves, the parens patriae jurisdiction originally exercised by the Court of 
Chancery has both a lengthy history and considerable breadth.P39F39P The judges of the 
High Court, save for Brennan J, acknowledged it to be without limit.P40F40P The Court 
held that amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘FLA’) in 1983 had 
conferred (as intended) a general ‘welfare’ jurisdiction on the Family Court akin 
to the parens patriae jurisdiction,P41F41P though absent the power to make a child a 
ward of court.P42F42P A child’s welfare could accordingly be ‘an independent subject’ 
founding proceedings under the FLA.P43F43P Following further amendments to the FLA 
in 1995, this power is now contained in section 67ZC(1).P44F44 P The four-member 
joint judgment of the High Court identified the non-therapeutic sterilisation of a 
                                                 
36 Ibid 296 (Deane J). 
37  Ibid 240 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
38  See, eg, the discussion of organ donation in Ian Kerridge, Michael Lowe and Cameron Stewart, Ethics 
and Law for the Health Professions (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2009) 483–4; Re GWW and CMW (1997) 
136 FLR 421. 
39  Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 258–9 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). Robert van 
Krieken dates the parens patriae jurisdiction back to the 17th century, identifying its first ‘judicial 
assertion’ in Falkland v Bertie (1696) 2 Vern 333, 342; 23 ER 814, 818 (Somers LC): Robert van 
Krieken, ‘The “Best Interests of the Child” and Parental Separation: On the “Civilizing of Parents”’ 
(2005) 68 Modern Law Review 25, 27.  
40  Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 258 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), 301–2 
(Deane J). Justice Brennan considered this proposition both ‘erroneous in law and disturbing in its social 
implications’: at 282.  
41  The Court noted that it was not strictly necessary to determine this issue as at the time the cross-vesting 
scheme later impugned by Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 was still in force: 
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth); Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 
(NT); Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 254–6 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).  
42  It has been held, however, that the absence of this power does not impact on the exercise of parens 
patriae: Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1992] Fam 64, 73F, 81C (Lord 
Donaldson MR). 
43  Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 257 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), citing what 
were then FLA ss 63(1), 64(1). 
44  Section 67ZC(1) was inserted by Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) s 31. It was later amended by 
Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth) sch 1 cl 38. 
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person unable to consent to be a procedure requiring court authorisation.P45F 45 P 
Moreover, the majority concluded that the equivalent jurisdiction to make such a 
determination conferred by the FLA did not permit a court to ‘enlarge’ the 
powers of a guardian so as to be able to consent.P46F 46 P In a separate judgment, 
McHugh J considered that parents or guardians could consent to such a procedure 
only in the presence of ‘compelling circumstances’,P47F47P including where there was 
a likelihood of the child’s health being seriously jeopardised or the child being in 
severe or regular ‘pain, fear or discomfort’.P48F48P Similarly, Deane J held that parents 
could consent to sterilisation if it were, ‘according to general community 
standards, obviously necessary for the welfare of the child’.P49F49P If sterilisation were 
not so obviously necessary, court authorisation would be required.P50F50P  
Justice Brennan, in dissent, found that neither a child’s guardian nor a court 
could consent to a non-therapeutic procedure. His Honour held that the ‘welfare 
power’ of a court was no wider than that of parents or guardians; a court could 
not authorise something contrary to the child’s best interests either under the 
common law or pursuant to the FLA.P51F51P Rather, the jurisdiction is supervisory: a 
court can make declarations as to whether, for example, a guardian has the power 
to authorise a particular procedure.P52F52 
 
A   The Jurisdiction of the Family Court 
Over a decade after Marion’s Case, the then Chief Justice of the Family 
Court considered the issue of consent in relation to a very different kind of 
medical treatment.P53F53P A 13-year-old child, Alex, born biologically female, sought 
hormone therapy to suppress development of female physical characteristics.P54F54 P 
Alex had identified as male from a young age and had been diagnosed with 
gender identity dysphoria.P55F 55 P Having previously been taken into care, Alex’s 
guardian was the Secretary of the Department of Health and Community 
Services, though he resided with his aunt. It was the Department which brought 
the application.  
                                                 
45  Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 249 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). Subsequently, 
this doctrine has been applied to other medical procedures, including tissue donation and treatment of 
children who are born intersex: see, eg, Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart, above n 38, 591–3.  
46  Ibid 257 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
47  Ibid 321. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Ibid 305. 
50  Ibid 306. 
51  Ibid 283–8.  
52  Ibid 279.  
53  Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89. The issue of authorising surgery in the case of a child with congenital 
adrenal hyperplasia had been considered by Mushin J in the earlier decision of Re A [1993] FLC 92-402. 
54  Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 92 [1]–[2] (Nicholson CJ). Surgical procedures prior to Alex turning 18 were 
not contemplated: at 92 [3] (Nicholson CJ).  
55  Ibid 92 [2] (Nicholson CJ). 
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Chief Justice Nicholson held that the determination about treatment required 
consideration first of whether Alex could consent to the treatment himself; and if 
not, whether Alex’s guardian could consent on his behalf – ultimately finding 
that the guardian could not. On the question of whether Alex could himself 
consent, Nicholson CJ referred to the evidence of Alex’s treating doctors, 
Professor P and Dr N, but considered both to be somewhat ambiguous on Alex’s 
capacity. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, intervening, 
submitted that if the Court should find that Alex ‘[had] achieved “a sufficient 
understanding and intelligence” to enable him “to understand fully what is 
proposed”, then [the] Court has no further role in this matter’.P56F56 P Chief Justice 
Nicholson doubted, however, that a 13-year-old would ever have the capacity to 
fully understand the implications of a change of sex. P57F57P The issue of children’s 
consent to treatment is discussed further below at Part IV.  
In Re Alex, two stages of treatment were discussed: the initial stage of 
hormone therapy was agreed to be ‘reversible’ treatment while the latter or 
second stage was ‘irreversible’ treatment. Importantly, Nicholson CJ determined 
to treat both stages as ‘part of a single package’,P 58F58P noting: 
It was submitted that the evidence showed [Alex] was eager for the treatment to 
commence and that if treatment were to commence, he both perceived and wished 
it would progress through to the irreversible hormonal treatment contemplated by 
the application, unless of course Alex elects to cease the treatment or clinical 
contraindications arise. It was also put on the basis of the expert evidence that to 
authorise the first stage of treatment but leave the subsequent stages for future 
application and determination by this Court would be destructive and anxiety-
provoking for him. P59F59 
Chief Justice Nicholson observed that given Alex conceptualised the 
treatment as a single plan, it would be unfair and possibly detrimental to allow 
the first stage to proceed only to herald the need for a further application to 
determine the ‘second stage’.P60F 60 P Reasoning by analogy to Marion’s Case, and  
such other case law as was applicable (although none of the cases dealt with 
precisely the same issue),P61F61P Nicholson CJ held that Re Alex did involve a ‘special 
medical procedure’.P62F62P Thus, Alex’s guardian could not authorise the procedure 
but Nicholson CJ gave court authorisation for treatment to commence.  
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This decision was highly controversial.P63F 63 P There was a particular focus by 
commentators on Alex’s young age, his family history – which included a very 
close relationship with his father, his father’s subsequent death and his rejection 
by his mother – and ultimately being taken into care.P64F64P Concern about Re Alex 
also stemmed from differing views of transsexualism, the very existence of 
‘gender dysphoria’ and whether and how it ought be treated.P65F65P  
Following the decision in Re Alex, a handful of cases involving transgender 
children were determined by the Family Court.P66F66P In each case, authorisation was 
given for treatment to proceed. 
The parties in the case of Re BernadetteP67F67P mounted the first direct challenge 
to the jurisdiction of the Court, submitting that the power to make the decision 
about the child’s hormone treatment was an aspect of parental responsibility. P68F68P 
Justice Collier made orders by consent at the conclusion of the hearing in 
November 2007 permitting Bernadette, then aged 15, to commence stage one 
treatment immediately and stage two treatment from January 2008.P69F69P However, 
his Honour did not deliver final orders and reasons until January 2010, the same 
month in which Bernadette turned 18.P70F70P Accordingly, although the parties lodged 
an appeal challenging his Honour’s conclusions about jurisdiction, this was 
dismissed by the Full Court holding itself to lack jurisdiction following 
Bernadette’s attainment of the age of majority.P71F71 
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After this attempt, a second challenge to jurisdiction was then mounted in Re 
Jamie. Similarly to Re Bernadette, Jamie’s parents, having received court 
authorisation for treatment to commence, challenged the need for the 
authorisation at all, arguing that the power to consent resided in them as Jamie’s 
parents. This time, the Full Court did consider the necessity for application to a 
court to enable treatment for ‘childhood gender identity disorder’ to proceed.P72F72P 
The Full Court unanimously held that stage one (reversible) treatment could be 
consented to by the parents, but maintained that stage two (irreversible) treatment 
remained a procedure to which only a court or the child could consent.P73F 73 P 
Notwithstanding the finding that, in an appropriate case, a child could himself or 
herself consent to the ‘stage two’ treatment, the Full Court held that whether the 
child is able to consent must still be determined by a court as a ‘threshold 
issue’.P74F74P Thus, for any stage two treatment to occur prior to the child turning 18, 
application must still, in all likelihood, be made to a court.  
 
III   A ‘DISEASE’ OR ‘BODILY MALFUNCTION’ 
As noted, in Marion’s Case, the High Court utilised the language of 
‘therapeutic’ and ‘non-therapeutic’ sterilisation, distinguishing the former by 
describing it as ‘appropriately carried out to treat some malfunction or disease’.P75F75P 
Such a distinction had been drawn previously by Nicholson CJ in deciding the 
case of Re Jane, also involving a child with an intellectual disability for whom a 
sterilisation procedure was sought.P76F 76 P The majority commented on their 
discomfort with the imprecision of these concepts, but concluded ‘it is necessary 
to make the distinction, however unclear the dividing line may be’. P77F 77 P In his 
separate judgment in Marion’s Case, Deane J opined that the imprecise 
distinction between ‘therapeutic’ and ‘non-therapeutic’ surgery ‘may be all but 
meaningless’ in the case of psychiatric illness.P78F78P Commentators have also noted 
the limitations and vagueness of the terminology: Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart 
observe that ‘[t]he distinction fails to tell us why some treatments need court 
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approval and others do not’.P79F79 P Bogdanoski discusses the medicalisation of the 
desire for ‘body modification’, suggesting that it is only by rationalising cross-
sex hormone therapy or surgery as the product of psychiatric abnormality that 
society can make sense of it:  
Rather than simply accepting the autonomous wishes of patients to … alter their 
gender, society is baffled by requests for body modification, and correspondingly 
needs to engage in discourses about whether such operations are therapeutic or 
non-therapeutic. P80F80 
In contrast, cosmetic surgeries aimed at ‘normalising’ or enhancing socially 
acceptable physical attributes (such as female breast enlargement) are considered 
culturally unremarkable.P81F 81 P Accordingly, critiques of a ‘medical model’ of 
transgender identity reject a pathologising approach and espouse a fluid concept 
of gender identity.P82F82P Yet, as Spade has noted, ‘the reliance on medical evidence 
and the medical assessment of gender identity is so deeply entrenched, no legal 
strategist can avoid working within requirements of medical documentation at 
least sometimes’.P83F 83 P Spade goes on to discuss concerns about relying on this 
approach to achieve rights for gender diverse people. While important, these 
problems are outside the scope of this article, which focuses on the problem of 
legal rather than medical regulation and concerns children, rather than adults. 
Moreover, the Court’s reliance on medical expertise in the case law indicates that 
it acts to replicate this regulation rather than as an independent safeguard, as 
noted below. 
As a matter of law, it is within the scope of parental power to consent to 
therapeutic treatment for a child. Accordingly, the classification of gender 
dysphoria as a ‘bodily malfunction’ or as ‘disease’ assumes a central importance. 
In determining Re Alex, Nicholson CJ seemed caught by the ‘therapeutic/non-
therapeutic’ distinction. His Honour determined that Alex’s condition, which was 
deliberately referred to as dysphoria rather than a ‘disorder’,P84F84P was not a disease.P85F85P 
His Honour considered that to label the condition as such would likely be 
offensive to gender diverse persons such as Alex,P86F86 P thus resisting the medical 
discourse or rationalisation described by Bogdanoski. P87F 87 P Yet, by refusing to 
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accede to the medicalisation or pathologising of Alex’s beliefs about his identity, 
Nicholson CJ was also cementing the view of hormone therapy for gender 
dysphoria as non-therapeutic, with unfortunate practical consequences. As 
Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart observe, this has the corresponding (and also 
potentially ‘insulting’) implication that ‘people with gender identity problems … 
have been necessarily classified as needing “non-therapeutic” treatment which 
sends a message that these illnesses are not real and devastating’.P88F88 
In contrast to Re Alex, the Full Court in Re Jamie clearly accepted and 
adopted a ‘medical model’ of gender diversity. The judgment uses the language 
of ‘disorder’ throughout, and the Court relied on the inclusion of ‘childhood 
gender identity disorder’ as a mental disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-4.P89F 89 P Soon after, the American Psychiatric 
Association revised this label, explaining that the condition would now be 
referred to as ‘gender dysphoria’.P90F90P The Association noted further that ‘gender 
nonconformity is not in itself a mental disorder. The critical element of gender 
dysphoria is the presence of clinically significant distress associated with the 
condition’.P91F91 
Chief Justice Bryant commented that:  
it is readily understandable why people with transsexualism are concerned about 
the psychiatric diagnoses of gender dysphoria or gender identity disorder, as they 
see themselves as merely an example of diversity in human sexual formation, 
rather than having a psychiatric condition … However whilst understanding this 
discomfort, I do not need to determine whether that characterisation is correct or 
not for the purpose of these proceedings … the weight of professional opinion is 
that it represents a particular category of pathology or mental illness. P92F92 
As Bryant CJ noted, the majority in Marion’s Case did not explicitly 
consider whether the ambit of the principles being espoused would extend to 
treatment of a ‘pathological condition or psychological disorder’.P93F93P Only Brennan 
J appeared to consider this to be the case.P94F94P Nevertheless, Bryant CJ and Finn J 
concluded that there was no need to limit the statements of the majority in 
Marion’s Case only to ‘physical disease’.P95F95P Importantly, all three members of the 
Full Court in Re Jamie concluded that the ‘therapeutic’ nature of stage one 
treatment meant that it was within parental power to authorise treatment on 
behalf of the child.P96F96P   
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As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, the Full Court in Re Jamie 
treated the issue of the ‘stages’ of treatment quite differently to Nicholson CJ in 
Re Alex. Following Re Alex, the practice in subsequent cases had been to 
consider stage one and stage two treatment as a single issue. Jamie, however, was 
only 10 at the time of the original hearing before Dessau J.P97F97P As it was suggested 
that stage two treatment would not be contemplated until Jamie was 16, Dessau J 
considered herself unable to be satisfied as to what would be in Jamie’s best 
interests six years into the future.P98F 98 P Accordingly, a further application to the 
Court was foreshadowed to be necessary when Jamie was approaching this age.   
Unfortunately, the separate consideration of stages one and two seems 
calculated to produce the exact result that Nicholson CJ considered it desirable to 
avoid in Re Alex – the creation of uncertainty and hence anxietyP99F99P – on the part of 
Jamie and her family. It is questionable whether delaying the decision could in 
fact even act as an additional safeguard. Court authorisation of stage two 
treatment would only result in that decision being placed back in the hands of the 
child, her family and the treating medical practitioners. Consistent with Chief 
Justice Nicholson’s earlier observation,P100F100 P there was no reason to suggest that 
Jamie would change her mind about proceeding with treatment, or more 
importantly that her family and doctors would not respect her wishes if she did 
change her mind. Moreover, if her treating medical practitioners at any time 
determined that it would not be in Jamie’s best interests to proceed, treatment 
would clearly be refused and hence would not proceed. Any controversy between 
child, family and doctors about that would then fall to be resolved, if necessary 
by the Court. Absent these circumstances, there could be no relevant issue arising 
at a later stage which would cause the Court to reach a different determination 
about the child’s best interests than it had at the earlier point in time. Indeed, the 
artificiality and irrelevance to the child of focusing on the two stages of treatment 
demonstrates a misunderstanding about the nature of gender dysphoria more 
generally.  
This leads, then, to a more fundamental problem with the Full Court’s 
reasoning in Re Jamie which arises in its consideration of stage two treatment.    
 
A   Therapeutic Treatment 
The majority of the High Court in Marion’s Case were clearly focused on 
‘non-therapeutic’ procedures, notwithstanding their Honours’ disquiet about the 
concept. The judges forming the majority twice distinguished the particular 
sterilisation under consideration for Marion from one carried out to remedy 
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disease or illness,P101F101P which would be a therapeutic procedure, stating: ‘But first it 
is necessary to make clear that, in speaking of sterilization in this context, we are 
not referring to sterilization which is a byproduct of surgery appropriately 
carried out to treat some malfunction or disease’.P102F102 
The majority continued:  
As a starting point, sterilization requires invasive, irreversible and major surgery. 
But so do, for example, an appendectomy and some cosmetic surgery, both of 
which, in our opinion, come within the ordinary scope of a parent to consent to. 
However, other factors exist which have the combined effect of marking out the 
decision to authorize sterilization as a special case. Court authorization is required, 
first, because of the significant risk of making the wrong decision, either as to a 
child’s present or future capacity to consent or about what are the best interests of 
a child who cannot consent, and secondly, because the consequences of a wrong 
decision are particularly grave. P103F103 
If, however, the procedure is a therapeutic one, the issues about the risk of 
making a wrong decision and the gravity of the consequences should not arise. 
Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart observe that in case of children with gender 
dysphoria, the Family Court appears to disregard the therapeutic nature of 
treatment which would otherwise bring it within the scope of parental consent.P104F104P 
This is what occurred in Re Jamie, where having determined the proposed 
treatment for Jamie to be therapeutic in nature, the Full Court nevertheless went 
on to consider issues relating to risk and gravity. 
The majority in Marion’s Case identified the grave consequences adverted to 
as being not only rendered unable to procreate but also the very fact of being so 
acted upon contrary to one’s wishes. Indeed, the majority stopped short of 
recognising a basic human right to procreate, but rather founded their decision in 
the right to ‘personal inviolability’.P105F105P In the majority judgment, the irreversible 
nature of sterilisation is not given greater weight, at least discursively, than the 
loss of control or subjugation of the child to an invasive procedure not in the 
child’s best interests.P106F106P   
In contrast, in the Family Court decisions the irreversible nature of the 
proposed treatment is accorded a key importance. Due to his finding that 
hormone therapy was non-therapeutic, Nicholson CJ in Re Alex focused on two 
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aspects of the decision in Marion’s Case: the ‘invasive, permanent and 
irreversible’ nature of the treatment; and that it was ‘not for the purpose of curing 
a malfunction or disease’.P107F107 P The decision of the Full Court in Re Jamie also 
hinged on the concept of irreversibility of treatment. In determining that stage 
one treatment was treatment within the normal scope of parental authorisation, 
Bryant CJ found that: 
if the treatment is in response to a disorder, even a psychological or psychiatric 
one, it is administered for therapeutic purposes. For that reason alone, in my view, 
the treatment at stage one … would not fall within the category of cases which the 
High Court was considering in Marion’s case. P108F108 
If it is found that stage one treatment is administered for a therapeutic 
purpose, so too must stage two treatment be. The ‘disorder’ being responded to is 
the same one; the purpose does not change just because the treatment may 
change. Nevertheless, Bryant CJ found that ‘[t]he complete reversibility, with 
few, if any, side effects, of stage one is a significant issue. Stage two is 
acknowledged to be different’.P109F109P   
Justice Finn was more explicit about the distinction between the stages: 
Stage two of the proposed treatment presents greater problems if only because it is 
… ‘irreversible in nature’ … This consideration must, in my view, remain 
important, even when it is accepted that the treatment can be categorised as 
therapeutic, and in this regard the concept of proportionality referred to by 
Brennan J must come into play. P110F110 
Justice Finn was here referring to dicta of Brennan J in Marion’s Case, 
wherein his Honour said that ‘“[n]on-therapeutic” medical treatment is 
descriptive of treatment which is inappropriate or disproportionate having regard 
to the … psychiatric disorder for which the treatment is administered’.P111F111P  
This interpretation, however, disregards the broader context of Justice 
Brennan’s dissenting judgment, given that his Honour found that neither parents 
nor the courts have the power to authorise a non-therapeutic medical procedure 
on a person incapable of consent.P112F112P Justice Brennan held that what is or is not 
therapeutic is a question of fact involving consideration of both purpose and 
proportionality.P113F113P Thus, the question of proportionality goes to determining the 
initial, fundamental question of whether the treatment is therapeutic, which is 
‘determined as a question of medical fact’.P114F114 P It is not to be balanced against 
undertaking a therapeutic treatment. Further, Brennan J noted that it could not ‘be 
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right’ to prevent a child from undertaking therapeutic treatment by compelling 
parents to first obtain leave of a court,P115F115P an issue discussed below at Part V. 
The other judges in Marion’s Case similarly held that parents can consent to 
treatment necessary to ‘alleviate pain, fear or discomfort’ (though not if there is a 
‘less drastic’ means to avoid the procedure)P116F116P or if the treatment is ‘so obviously 
necessary’ for the child’s welfare.P117F117 P Logically, Justice Brennan’s dicta might 
support an argument that stage one treatment is therapeutic because it is 
proportionate to the end to be achieved, but stage two treatment is non-
therapeutic as its irreversible nature is disproportionate to that same end. This 
was not, however, the finding in Re Jamie. Furthermore, even this formulation is 
problematic as the emphasis which the Full Court placed on ‘irreversibility’ 
overlooks the irreversible effect of not undergoing treatment.  
 
B   Irreversible Effects 
Without treatment, a child wishing to transition from male to female will, 
with the onset of puberty, begin to develop masculine characteristics, aspects of 
which are irreversible, such as the deepening of the voice. A child wishing to 
transition from female to male will develop feminine physical characteristics that 
also cannot be reversed, at least without surgical intervention.P118F118P  
In the context of children with gender dysphoria, to distinguish between 
reversible and irreversible treatment is not a useful way to determine whether the 
treatment is itself therapeutic. In contradistinction to the situation in Marion’s 
Case, for children with gender dysphoria, not receiving treatment is irreversible 
just as receiving treatment is irreversible. As Shield has argued, adolescents ‘will 
forever see the mark of this delay on [their] body’.P119F119P Moreover, and importantly 
in light of the perceived connection between the ‘sterilisation cases’ and the 
‘gender dysphoria’ cases, the second stage of hormone therapy does not 
necessarily result in irreversible sterilisation, although it is likely that with 
prolonged use of hormones fertility will diminish and eventually be lost 
altogether.P120F120P Yet by focusing on the concept of irreversibility, the Family Court 
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sidesteps the logical consequence of the finding that hormone therapy for gender 
dysphoria is therapeutic, which is that a court need not make the determination.  
The weight placed on irreversibility is all the more remarkable if one 
considers that if a child is diagnosed as having gender dysphoria, the diagnosis of 
itself determines the possible treatment. That is, the diagnosis stems from the fact 
that the desire of the child for his or her physical characteristics to correspond to 
his or her inner subjective feelings about his or her gender is so strong, physical 
change may be the best and indeed only method by which to preserve his or her 
mental health, and possibly life. As a medical professional quoted in Re LucyP121F121P 
opined, ‘[u]ntreated Gender Dysphoria invariably progresses to immense 
disillusionment and then, to chronic depression which can often progress to 
Major Depression, with significant suicidal risk’.P122F122P The recent survey of Smith et 
al found not only extremely high reports of suicidal thoughts amongst young 
gender diverse people but also of suicide attempts.P123F 123 P In gender dysphoric 
children, the development of secondary sexual characteristics may increase 
unhappiness with the body and ‘comorbid’ symptoms (such as body dysmorphia 
and other obsessional disorders),P124F124 P as well as ‘depression, anxiety, self-harm, 
suicidality, substance use and high risk sexual behaviors’.P125F 125 P Thus, the 
seriousness of a ‘change’ of gender is seen as more grave than all of these well-
documented risks. 
The disaggregation of stages one and two, and the overwhelming concern 
with irreversibility, has a more subtle effect too, serving to reinforce norms about 
the essentially binary nature of social conceptions of gender.P126F126P The focus of the 
decision shows that any concept of gender fluidity is anathema – a person may be 
one gender or another, and the critical part of the decision is around when that 
may occur, hence the preoccupation with ‘stage two’. 
Stage one treatment can only provide a holding pattern, and like a holding 
pattern, for a finite amount of time. As Nicholson CJ correctly observed in 
relation to Alex,P127F127P children, their families and their treating medical practitioners 
do not enter into stage one treatment absent the intention to at least consider 
continuing to stage two treatment: the diagnosis in and of itself imports this. This 
is reflected in research suggesting that gender dysphoria existing since childhood 
and which is exacerbated rather than diminished with puberty, is unlikely to 
                                                 
121  (2013) 286 FLR 327. 
122  Ibid 332 [18] (Murphy J). 
123  Smith et al, above n 3, 67. 
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125  Olson and Forcier, above n 120, citing Johanna Olson, Catherine Forbes and Marvin Belzer, 
‘Management of the Transgender Adolescent’ (2011) 165 Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent 
Medicine 171; Kenneth J Zucker, ‘The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Gender Identity Disorder in 
Children’ (2010) 39 Archives of Sexual Behavior 477. 
126  Senate Community Affairs References Committee, above n 1, 13 [1.51]; though note the recent decision 
of the High Court in Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (NSW) v Norrie (2014) 250 CLR 490. 
127  Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 122–3 [188]–[189]. 
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subside.P128F128P A prospective follow-up study of 70 gender dysphoric young people 
found that all elected to proceed to cross-sex hormone therapy following 
hormonal suppression of puberty.P129F129P In the only Australian study, which predated 
Re Jamie, 17 out of 21 young people ‘experienced persistence of profound 
[gender dysphoria] with increased distress following commencement of puberty 
and were therefore considered eligible for hormone treatment’.P130F130 
The artificiality of distinguishing between the two stages, as far as the child 
involved is concerned, is apparent. There is little utility in undertaking stage one 
treatment without this being followed by stage two treatment, other than to buy 
more time. While this may be necessary and appropriate in a treatment context, 
in a legal sense, drawing a distinction between stages one and two has the effect 
only of delaying the decision that a court will eventually be called upon to make. 
Yet, as discussed below, the Full Court in Re Jamie had reason to encourage this 
delay. 
 
IV   GILLICK COMPETENCE AND CONSENT 
In the gender dysphoria cases, it has been accepted (and confirmed in Re 
Jamie) that children or young people may be able to consent to hormone 
treatment themselves while still minors, but the circumstances in which this will 
be possible are not defined with precision.P131F131 P This imprecision arises from the 
approval in Marion’s Case of a test of ‘Gillick competence’ set out by Lord 
Scarman in that decision:P132F132P ‘A minor is, according to this principle, capable of 
giving informed consent when he or she “achieves a sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed”’.P133F133 
In Re Alex, Nicholson CJ was not satisfied on the evidence that Alex was 
able to fully comprehend the effect of the treatment envisaged. However, his 
Honour was not required to fully determine whether Alex could consent to 
treatment, as it was found both that Alex wanted the treatment and that it was in 
his best interests.P134F134 
As was argued by the appellants in Re Jamie, the situation of children with 
gender dysphoria is arguably starkly different to that of children (and indeed 
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133  Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 237 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), citing Gillick v 
West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 1 AC 112, 189 (Lord Scarman).  
134  Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 99 [49]. 
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adults) with intellectual disabilities considered in the ‘sterilisation’ cases. The 
High Court in Marion’s Case proceeded on an assumption that Marion would 
never attain the ‘competence’ to be able to consent to treatment herself.P135F135P Gender 
diverse children, by contrast, can be expected to draw nearer to attaining Gillick 
competence as they age.   
Jamie herself was, as noted, only 10 at the time of the initial application. This 
is reportedly not uncommon: the years from 10 to 13 are likely to be a critical 
time for children displaying childhood gender non-conformism.P136 F 136 P Jamie’s 
treating doctors did not envisage ‘stage two’ treatment commencing until she 
reached the age of 16, which is the age proposed in Endocrine Society clinical 
guidelines.P137F 137 P This is also the age at which, in some Australian jurisdictions, 
children are presumed to be able to consent to medical treatment,P138F138P as Bryant CJ 
noted in her judgment.P139F139P Her Honour further explained, in a sensitive passage, 
that there is no reason why a competent child should not be able to make his or 
her own decision about commencing stage two treatment: 
one might think that, of all the medical treatments that might arise, treatment for 
something as personal and essential as the perception of one’s gender and 
sexuality would be the very exemplar of when the rights of the Gillick-competent 
child should be given full effect. P140F140 
The positing of 16 as the typical age for stage two treatment to commence 
seems to have struck the Full Court as a useful escape route from the quagmire of 
judicial decision-making in such cases. If parents can consent to stage one 
treatment, and stage two treatment would typically proceed when the child is at 
an age where he or she is likely to be able to consent, then a court might not be 
required to make a determination about treatment at all. In Re Lucy, handed down 
just weeks before Re Jamie, Murphy J found that allowing Lucy to undergo 
reversible treatment would provide a ‘hiatus’ until the child is ‘Gillick 
competent’ or becomes an ‘adult’.P141F141 
Yet it becomes quickly apparent that any ostensible relinquishment of control 
over this area of decision-making is illusory, as the Full Court held that the 
                                                 
135  The problems inhering in such an immutable view of disability are discussed elsewhere: see Linda Steele, 
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decision about whether or not a child is indeed Gillick competent is one that must 
be made by the Court itself.P142F142P Both Bryant CJ and Finn J described themselves as 
reluctant to reach this conclusion but bound by Marion’s Case on the issue,P143F143P 
Finn J describing the latter as enshrining: 
the requirement … for court authorisation for irreversible medical treatment in 
circumstances where there is a significant risk of the wrong decision being made 
as to the child’s capacity to consent to the treatment and where the consequences 
of such a wrong decision are particularly grave …P144F144 
In a short concurring judgment, Strickland J repeated this finding.P145F145P   
Such an analysis of Marion’s Case overlooks the fact that the High Court 
was concerned only with what was found to be a non-therapeutic procedure. In 
the Family Court’s interpretation, the concept of ‘irreversible’ treatment seems to 
be substituted for ‘non-therapeutic’ treatment.   
As quoted above, the majority in Marion’s Case described non-therapeutic 
sterilisation of a child with an intellectual disability as carrying a ‘significant risk 
of making the wrong decision, either as to a child’s present or future capacity to 
consent or about what are the best interests of a child who cannot consent’.P146F146P 
These two issues are not clearly distinguished from one another in the ensuing 
discussion, but earlier in their judgment the majority had dealt at some length 
with the reasons why the decision about capacity to consent will be more difficult 
to make in the case of a child with an intellectual disability.P147F147P Having described 
the Gillick test, the majority noted that ‘the fact that a child suffers an intellectual 
disability makes consideration of the capacity to consent a different matter’.P148F148P 
The majority explained that this was due to the widely differing capabilities of 
children with disabilities, who cannot be treated as homogenous. P149F149P Importantly, 
their Honours concluded ‘there is no reason to assume that all disabled children 
are incapable of giving consent to treatment’.P150F150 
Of even greater import, perhaps, the majority identified the risk of making 
the wrong decision in such cases and expressed caution about assuming medical 
professionals would always make ‘correct’ decisions.P151F151 P This derived from the 
judges’ awareness of ‘misconceptions on the part of others in society’ P152F152P about 
persons with intellectual disabilities and the fact that such misconceptions are 
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likely to be heightened when it comes to issues involving sexuality or sexual 
identity.P153F153 
The majority therefore clearly distinguish the assessment of competency in 
the case of children with intellectual disabilities from the assessment of those 
without. It is the presence of intellectual disability as well as the context of the 
decision to be made that creates the ‘significant risk of making the wrong 
decision’ as to competency. P154F154P Marion’s Case does not mandate a finding that 
such a risk is automatically present in cases involving children with gender 
dysphoria nor the asserted consequence that it is for a court alone to make the 
assessment of competence. 
From its earliest consideration of these types of cases, the Family Court has 
been relatively reluctant to find children able to consent to treatment for gender 
dysphoria. The nature of the way that the decisions had always been considered 
prior to Re Jamie meant that it was unnecessary to make definitive findings about 
children’s consent, as the Court would always have material available to 
determine that treatment was nevertheless in children’s best interests. Thus, the 
procedure seems to have been to consider whether the child is ‘capable of 
making an informed decision’ concerning treatment,P155F155P but in the knowledge that 
the Court was not authorising something which the child did not want or which 
was not also appropriate. 
 
A   Conflicting and Coincident Interests 
One concern of the majority in Marion’s Case was that the interest of parents 
and families in the child undergoing sterilisation might be different from, or in 
conflict with, the interests of the child herself.P156F156P Appropriately, the High Court 
was exceedingly concerned about the improper treatment of children with 
disabilities.P157F157 P Mandating application to a court is for the purpose of ensuring 
protection against an abuse of rights – primarily, the right to ‘bodily 
inviolability’.P158F 158 P Justice Brennan, who considered that no one could have the 
power to permit non-therapeutic sterilisation, referred to ‘the law’s protection of 
the human dignity of the intellectually disabled child’.P159F159P   
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Again, however, the situation of gender dysphoric children is not analogous, 
particularly when the ‘irreversibility’ of both proceeding or not proceeding with 
treatment is considered. This is illustrated by the distressing situation of the child 
in the early case of Re A, decided by Mushin J.P160F160P A natal female, A, had been 
born with congenital adrenal hyperplasia, causing him to develop masculine 
characteristics. Due to receiving inadequate hormone treatment as a child, these 
characteristics became more pronounced and thus, as a 14-year-old, A was forced 
to apply to the Family Court seeking further surgical procedures to enable him to 
present as a male.P161F 161 P Justice Mushin was critical of A’s parents for not 
appropriately adhering to the treatment plan for A and the ‘appalling situation’ 
that A subsequently found himself in.P162F162 
For gender dysphoric children, the decision about treatment options cannot 
be delayed beyond a certain point without this affecting the outcome, nor is there 
a ‘less invasive’ option for consideration. Indeed, as one of Jamie’s treating 
doctors explained, to withhold hormone treatment ‘would be experienced as quite 
“invasive” in itself [due to] the unwanted masculinisation of her body’.P163F163 
The eugenicist overtones imported by the sterilisation of girls with 
disabilities which so concerned the High CourtP164F 164 P are not present. Arguably, 
parents and doctors are rather responding appropriately to children’s expression 
of their gender and severe distress and unhappiness with their body.P165F 165 P The 
appellants in Re Jamie submitted that the only benefit to them of Jamie 
undergoing treatment was to have a child who was well and not unhappy.P166F166P In 
the case of Re O, the evidence was that: 
The past two years for O have been dogged by periods of significant depression 
and suicidal thoughts associated with his gender identity. O has reported to his 
treating psychiatrist, Professor P, disgust about his body. … O has told him that 
‘at times he feels his life is not worth living because of the feeling of being 
trapped in the wrong body’. P167F167 
It is common in the case law for children to have reported suicidal thoughts 
and sometimes suicide attempts.P168F168 P It seems likely also that the court process 
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would contribute to children’s distress and anxiety due to a perception that a 
court may not permit or allow the treatment sought,P169F169P as well as the attendant 
stress placed on their family. It is inhumane that children must experience the 
level of suffering described in the case law before being permitted to access 
treatment, and would seem to be inconsistent with the child’s ‘best interests’.P170F170P  
This is distinct from a situation involving conflicting views about the 
diagnosis and treatment of gender dysphoria for a child, where it may be 
appropriate that a court’s powers are invoked. The Family Court’s mandate is, 
inter alia, to resolve disputes relating to the parenting of children. Thus, similarly 
to case law involving other types of medical procedure, if for example parents 
have differing views about the type of treatment that is appropriate, it may be 
necessary for application to be made to a court for determination of the issues.P171F171P 
This is, however, quite different to requiring children and parents to apply to the 
Court under section 67ZC(1) of the FLA for permission to undergo treatment 
which everyone is agreed upon. If there is a debate about whether a particular 
treatment is indeed therapeutic or not, for example due to parental disagreement 
about treatment, this gives rise to a situation more appropriate for a court to 
consider if only because of the failure to agree on a major long-term issue in the 
child’s life. Otherwise, it is unacceptable that children must endure years of 
suffering before being permitted access to hormone therapy, or more pertinently 
post-Re Jamie, whether they will be allowed to continue treatment which has 
commenced in the form of ‘stage one’.    
To date, there is a general absence of countervailing viewpoints in the cases 
involving children with gender dysphoria. In Re Alex, Alex’s mother was 
reported to be unsupportive of Alex’s gender identification, but she no longer had 
parental responsibility, could not be located and did not participate in the 
proceedings despite being named as respondent.P172F172P Aside from this, the reported 
cases have tended to involve children, parents, medical practitioners, family 
report writers, independent children’s lawyers and concerned intervenors such as 
the Human Rights Commission,P173F173P who concur in supporting treatment.  
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The significance of this is not that parents and guardians are uniformly 
supportive of childhood manifestations of gender non-conformism. In fact, the 
opposite is likely to be true.P174F 174 P If parents or guardians lack understanding of 
gender dysphoria or the particular treatment recommended, a child is unlikely to 
be sufficiently supported to access treatment, let alone the court process.P175F 175 P 
Rather, it illustrates the practical limits of the protective function that a court is 
intended to fulfil in such cases. Though Family Court proceedings are sometimes 
described as semi-inquisitorial, judges are confined to making determinations on 
evidence appropriately brought before the Court.P176F 176 P In Re A, Mushin J 
commented on the attendant difficulty faced by the Court when there was nobody 
to put a ‘contrary view’.P177F177 P Where all the evidence tends in a single direction 
only, it is hard to see what independent safeguard a court can provide. Though it 
is typical for the Family Court to appoint an independent children’s lawyer to 
represent the child’s interests in such cases, these lawyers have always been 
supportive of the child accessing treatment.P178F178P  
It is also to be remembered that in each reported case, it is the child or young 
person in question who has been the main instigator of the process, at times 
contrary to the wishes, at least initially, of his or her parents. Indeed, displaying 
‘strong cross-gender identity from an early age’P179F179P forms part of the diagnostic 
criteria for gender dysphoria. Again, by definition, these young people have spent 
many years thinking about who they are and what they want in terms of their 
gender identification.  
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V   CONCLUSION: THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL 
INVIOLABILITY 
The significance of continued judicial control over decision-making in this 
area cannot be underestimated. In terms of practical consequences, there is 
considerable expense, time and distress associated with applying to the Family 
Court.P180F180 P This is not alleviated by reference to the small numbers of children 
making application to the Court or the fact that the Court has never refused to 
permit treatment in a gender dysphoria case.P181F181P Generally, it is suggested that the 
relative numbers of adolescents receiving treatment for gender dysphoria is low, 
and often patients present later on, when suppression of puberty will be less 
effective.P182F182P In Australia, Hewitt et al reported (pre-Re Jamie) that some families 
did not pursue hormone treatment due to the cost and stress of making a court 
application.P183F183P Thus many young people, as a medical practitioner opined in Re 
Brodie, ‘just suffer out there’.P184F184 
Although the Chief Justice in Re Jamie foreshadowed that applications 
concerning a child’s capacity to consent ‘would only need to address the question 
of Gillick competence and once established the court would have no further 
role’,P185F185P two problems can be immediately identified. First, although her Honour 
was suggesting that less evidence would be required, this does not diminish the 
need for an applicant to instruct solicitors, obtain advice, make application to the 
Court and produce evidence in proper form. Expense, stress and time are unlikely 
to be considerably diminished. 
Secondly, there remains uncertainty surrounding the decision that a court will 
actually make. In the cases to date, as discussed above, the Family Court will not 
necessarily find a child competent to make such a life-altering decision. Children, 
parents and lawyers would thus be unwise to proceed to a hearing of the 
application without being able to lay their hands on the further evidence needed 
to demonstrate that treatment is in the child’s best interests in the event that the 
claims about competency are not accepted. To prepare the case on a more limited 
basis could lead to a situation where, if a court finds a child is not competent to 
make the decision, a second application would need to be made.  
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The majority in Marion’s Case discussed the importance of the right  
to bodily or personal inviolability by reference to the serious implications  
of ‘violation’ of the right. It was recognised that such impacts extend beyond  
the physical to ‘serious questions of a person’s “social and biological 
identity”’,P186F 186 P and attendant social and psychological effects. Their Honours 
observed that sterilisation ‘is not merely a medical issue’.P187F 187 P The Court was,  
after all, considering an ‘invasive’ medicalised procedure (an hysterectomy) 
undertaken for ostensibly ‘non-medical’ (and, the judges concluded, non-
therapeutic) reasons, including concerns about the potential effects of 
menstruation, pregnancy and childbirth on Marion.  
In applying the principles of Marion’s Case to the situation of gender 
dysphoric children, the right to personal inviolability needs to be reconsidered  
in light of a very different set of circumstances. Yet the serious questions  
about ‘identity, social place and self-esteem’ P188F188P remain entirely relevant. As two 
commentators have noted, such procedures: 
are not simply for the purpose of curing an illness or improving health, but are 
inextricably associated with the patient’s self-identity. The consequences of not 
allowing treatment where that is sought or alternatively, of carrying out treatment 
where that is not wanted, can be terrible, having consequences lasting throughout 
a person's lifetime and affecting not only health, fertility and the ability to have a 
fulfilling sex life, but also psychological well-being and identity. P189F189 
In the case of gender dysphoric children, having treatment or not having 
treatment both result in some irreversible physical effects. To deny young people 
the opportunity to access treatment is to deny the opportunity to develop the 
physical characteristics of the person they already see themselves as being; or 
indeed, know themselves to be.  
A broader conceptualisation of the right to personal inviolability would 
encompass the idea of a right to control one’s own body, whether this is to 
restrict or prevent an invasive procedure or to access treatment that will result in 
alterations to one’s physical characteristics.P190F190 P The majority in Marion’s Case 
referred to ‘a right to do with one’s person what one chooses’.P191F 191 P This is 
commensurate also with the right to access medical treatment regardless of 
whether the treatment transgresses social norms about gender identity. 
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This is not to suggest that hormone therapy is appropriate for all children 
exhibiting gender non-conforming behaviour.P192F192P The point is that decisions about 
the appropriate therapy for individual children are ones that should be made 
collectively by children, parents and treating medical professionals, absent 
disagreement amongst them. The diagnosis of gender dysphoria already imports 
a clinical level of distress and attendant risk. As Murphy J noted in Re Sam: 
‘Each of the experts identifies that the proposed treatment not only accords with 
the clinical practice guidelines, but is, at present, the only treatment available for 
individuals suffering from Gender Dysphoria’.P193F193 
As Millbank observed following the decision in Re Alex, hormone therapy 
carries some risks and some unknowns, but ‘to ignore a child in this deep 
distress, in suicidal distress, is also experimenting in the cruellest way on 
children’.P194F 194 P Hewitt et al also note that the long-term outcomes of hormone 
therapy are unknown, but continue:  
These do not seem equitable or just reasons for restricting a young person’s access 
to medical care. Furthermore, a young person observing the distress that court 
application causes for the parents may feel uncomfortable expressing any doubts 
they have regarding hormone treatment.P195F195 
That is, once court approval is obtained, a young person may actually feel 
less able to cease the treatment given the expenditure and stress he or she has 
caused to his or her parents or guardian to be able to proceed in the first place.   
The decision in Re Jamie is a step in the right direction, but growing medical 
consensus, the absence of alternate viewpoints and evidence in the reported 
cases, and the established serious risks of harm to children who are not able to 
access treatment, all mitigate against the Court continuing to play any role in 
determining whether treatment can proceed. If hormone therapy in this context is 
accepted as being therapeutic, it cannot be right, as Brennan J observed, to insist 
that children obtain the Court’s permission to undergo that treatment.P196F 196 P The 
Court’s expansion of its jurisdiction to encompass treatment for gender dysphoria 
is not fulfilling its stated function of protecting children. Rather, it is causing 
further distress and harm.   
As noted, Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart suggest that the distinction  
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic procedures is unhelpful.P197F197P Instead, they 
recommend that specific types of medical intervention be listed or included  
in regulations specifying whether judicial permission is required before they  
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193  [2013] FamCA 563, [94] (emphasis added). 
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be undertaken or performed on children or incapacitated persons.P198F198P This may, 
indeed, be the preferable course.  
Regardless of whether the therapeutic/non-therapeutic distinction remains as 
a matter of law, commencing treatment for gender dysphoria in children is a 
decision that children, their parents or guardians and a multidisciplinary team of 
medical professionals should make, not the courts. 
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